

POLS GU4423: Political Economy Analysis of Elites and Institutions
Department of Political Science, Columbia University

Spring 2023

Class meetings: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:10am-11:35am

Location: 603 Hamilton Hall

Professor: John Marshall

Office: 705 International Affairs Building

Office hours: Wednesdays, 4-6pm; [signup](#)

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COURSE OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES

This course examines political institutions and elite behavior from a political economy perspective. In particular, we will focus on how institutions and incentives shape the actions of governments, politicians, and bureaucrats, enabling us to analyze key contemporary questions:

- Does state capacity matter, and why are some states stronger than others?
- Why do societies vary in the extent to which their institutions are democratic?
- How do democratic institutions affect macroeconomic and distributive outcomes?
- When, if ever, do democratic institutions represent voter policy preferences?
- Who becomes a politician, and does the type of politician who gets elected matter?
- Under what conditions does the media support political accountability?
- When are elections and policies subverted by special interests and electoral malpractice?
- What causes and prevents corruption?
- When do bureaucrats serve the state?

This course has three core goals. First, the substantive goal is to familiarize students with foundational theoretical arguments and frontier empirical evidence pertaining to the political economy of elites and institutions. Second, the methodological goal is to empower students to understand and implement analytical techniques and empirical designs that can illuminate substantive research questions. Third, the skill-building goal is to expose students to the academic processes of reviewing papers, replicating and extending others' studies, presenting research projects, and developing and writing original research designs or papers.

We will use game-theoretic models and design-based causal inference to generate hypotheses, identify causal effects in developed and especially developing contexts, and seek to interpret them. In contrast with POLS GR8422, "Political Economy Analysis of Political Behavior," which examines voter-level behavior through a political economy lens, this class examines how

elite behavior interacts with political institutions and voters to explain more macro phenomena. The methodological content of this course will cover applied mathematical models of behavior and systematically address methodological innovations as they arise. In particular, lectures (and associated readings) will cover the following statistical topics during the course: placebo tests; causal mediation; difference-in-discontinuities; synthetic control methods; estimating spillover effects; measurement error; and measuring elusive and sensitive variables.

COURSE PREREQUISITES

This course is primarily intended for postgraduate and advanced undergraduate students in political science, economics, and other social sciences. As such:

- The course will assume familiarity with intermediate game theory and econometrics/statistics. The purpose of this class is to deepen, complement, and apply these skills obtained in other classes.
- For the replication assignment, students are expected to be proficient using a statistical software of their choice or in proving formal theoretical results.

The class will be capped at 20 students. Preference will be given to postgraduate students and advanced undergraduate students.

COURSE STRUCTURE

The class is structured around two lectures held each week. Although participation will not be graded, students are expected to ask and engage with questions during lectures.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Grades will be assigned according to the following components of the course:

- **Reviewer assignment (20%).** Each student must write a referee report for a paper of their choice from the reading list. The referee report should be 3-4 double-spaced pages long. A typical referee report contains the following information: (i) a succinct paragraph summarizing the paper; (ii) a paragraph or two describing the paper's principal contributions, relative to what we previously knew, as well as a brief summary of your main critiques and assessment of the importance of such critiques; and (iii) a number of paragraphs critically engaging with the paper – this could, for example, challenge or better motivate its theoretical importance or originality, highlight limits to the empirical contributions (i.e. what can be learned), or make theoretical or methodological suggestions to generalize the findings or demonstrate the robustness of results. If you really like the paper, the critical component of the review could also carefully explain why you think the paper makes a substantial contribution beyond what is already known.

You may want to check out Professor Humphreys' helpful reviewer guide at macartan.nyc/teaching/how-to-critique. The report is due via email by 11:55pm on **Friday February 10th 2023**.

- **Replication and extension assignment (30%).** Working *in pairs*, students will replicate and extend a *published* empirical or theoretical paper from the reading list. Most journals now require authors to deposit their data and replication code online, although older papers may require you to politely email authors to request their data. Mathematical proofs are usually in a paper's appendix or online appendix/supplementary materials. However, this assignment does *not* simply entail downloading the replication materials and checking that the code/proof is correct. Rather, after first verifying that the results of interest to you are indeed correct, you should explore a major additional line of enquiry or several minor lines of inquiry. The core of this task is the extension, not the replication! Lines of enquiry should:
 - *Investigate the robustness of the results*; e.g. are the results robust to adding a potentially important omitted control? are sample restrictions justified? are the results sensitive to measurement choices? can you weaken or alter the assumptions required for proving the main results?
 - *Extend the results*; e.g. cast further light on the theoretical argument by examining theoretically-relevant moderators or mediators, consider additional outcome variables or related treatment variables, or conduct a similar analysis in a different context/sample to examine external validity.

The replication report is due via email by 11:55pm on **Friday March 10th 2023**. For statistical projects, students may use any software of their choice for this assignment, but should provide full replication data and code upon submission; this class will not teach the use of statistical software. For theoretical projects, all proofs should be provided. The write-up is expected to be 10-15 double-spaced pages.

- **Research assignment (50%).** This assignment should be an 15-30 page double-spaced paper undertaking original research. It can be one of two types:
 - *Research paper*: an original paper addressing a topic related to the substantive themes of the course that uses some of the formal or empirical approaches encountered in the course (or even both!).
 - *Grant application* (most relevant for PhD students): applications (which you should intend to submit!) should pertain to a substantive theme of the course and contain a detailed (possibly formal) theory, design, power calculation, pre-analysis plan, and plan for external funding. In other words, it should be a research paper without the results.

This final paper is due via email by 11:55pm on **Friday May 12th 2023**. You are welcome to take incompletes, but it is your responsibility to ensure that doing so complies with your program's requirements.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

Columbia University does not tolerate cheating or plagiarism in any form. Students violating the code of academic and professional conduct will be subject to disciplinary procedures. Guidelines on academic integrity are available at college.columbia.edu/academics/integrity, and all students are expected to be familiar with and abide by them.

COURSE OUTLINE

The following list of references provides a guideline for the readings that will be covered in lectures. Lectures will focus on the most influential, interesting, and pedagogical readings. Readings denoted by * will be the primary focus of lectures, while readings denoted by + relate to a methodological topic addressed in a lecture.

Lecture 1, 1/17 – Introduction and theorizing the effects of state capacity

*Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. “Politics and economics in weak and strong states.” *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(7):1199-1226.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2018. “The Emergence of Weak, Despotism and Inclusive States.” Working paper.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2019. *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*. Penguin.

Bates, Robert. 2020. *The Political Economy of Development*. Cambridge University Press.

Berwick, Elissa, and Fotini Christia. 2018. “State Capacity Redux: Integrating Classical and Experimental Contributions to an Enduring Debate.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 21:71-91.

Cantoni, Davide, Yuyu Chen, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y. Jane Zhang. 2017. “Curriculum and Ideology.” *Journal of Political Economy* 125(3):338-392.

*Dincecco, Mark, and Yuhua Wang. Forthcoming. “State Capacity in Historical Political Economy.” In Jeffrey Jenkins and Jared Rubin, *Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy*, Oxford University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press.

+Imbens, Guido W., and Donald B. Rubin. 2015. *Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press.

*Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87(3):567-576.

Paglayan, Agustina S. 2022. "Education or Indoctrination? The Violent Origins of Public School Systems in an Era of State-Building." *American Political Science Review* 116(4):1242-1257.

Lecture 2, 1/19 – Does state capacity matter for economic and political outcomes?

Acemoglu, Daron, Giuseppe De Feo, and Giacomo Davide De Luca. 2020. "Weak states: Causes and consequences of the Sicilian Mafia." *Review of Economic Studies* 87(2):537-581.

Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson. 2015. "State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach." *American Economic Review* 105(8):2364-2409.

Cantoni, Davide, Cathrin Mohr, and Matthias Weigand. 2021. "The Rise of Fiscal Capacity." Working Paper.

*Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin. 2018. "The Historical State, Local Collective Action and Economic Development in Vietnam." *Econometrica* 86(6):2083-2121.

Dincecco, Mark, James Fenske, Anil Menon, and Shivaji Mukherjee. 2022. "Pre-Colonial Warfare and Long-Run Development in India." *Economic Journal* 132(643):981-1010.

*Dincecco, Mark, and Gabriel Katz. 2016. "State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance." *Economic Journal* 126(590):189-218.

Dincecco, Mark, and Mauricio Prado. 2012. "Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance." *Journal of Economic Growth* 17(3):171-203.

*Dittmar, Jeremiah E., and Ralf R. Meisenzahl. 2020. "Public Goods Institutions, Human Capital, and Growth: Evidence from German History." *Review of Economic Studies* 87(2):959-996.

Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. "The Imperatives of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy* 15(2):17-31.

*Gennaioli, Nicola, and Ilija Rainer. 2007. "The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa." *Journal of Economic Growth* 12(3):185-234.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1966. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Belknap Press.

*Hanson, Jonathan K., and Rachel Sigman. 2021. "Leviathan's latent dimensions: Measuring state capacity for comparative political research." *Journal of Politics* 83(4):1495-1510.

*Heldring, Leander. 2020. "Bureaucracy as a Tool for Politicians: Evidence from Weimar and Nazi Germany." Working paper.

Heldring, Leander. 2021. "The Origins of Violence in Rwanda." *Review of Economic Studies* 88(2):730-763.

Krasner, Stephen. 1984. "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics." *Comparative Politics* 223-246.

Krueger, Anne O. 1990. "Government Failures in Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4(3):9-23.

Lee, Alexander. 2019. "Land, State Capacity, and Colonialism: Evidence From India." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(3):412-444.

Levi, Margaret. 1988. *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press.

*Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2013. "Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development." *Econometrica* 81(1):113-152.

Nunn, Nathan, and Diego Puga. 2012. "Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(1):20-36.

Lecture 3, 1/24 – Where do strong states come from? – top-down rapacity: wars and extraction

Abramson, Scott F. 2017. “The Economic Origins of the Territorial State.” *International Organization* 71(1):97-130.

Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski. 2010. “Power Fluctuations and Political Economy.” *Journal of Economic Theory* 146(3):1009-1041.

Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. “Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States.” *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52:1199-1226.

Bates, Robert H., and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. 1985. “A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government.” *Politics and Society* 14(1):53-70.

*Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2009. “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics.” *American Economic Review* 99(4):1218-1244.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2010. “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development.” *Econometrica* 78(1):1-34.

Blaydes, Lisa, and Christopher Paik. 2016. “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe.” *International Organization* 70(3):551-586.

Boix, Carles. 2015. *Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Cambridge University Press.

Dincecco, Mark, James Fenske, and Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato. 2019. “Is Africa different? Historical conflict and state development.” *Economic History of Developing Regions* 34(2):209-250.

Garfias, Francisco, and Emily Sellers. Forthcoming. “State Building in Historical Political Economy.” In Jeffrey Jenkins and Jared Rubin, *Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy*, Oxford University Press.

*Garfias, Francisco, and Emily A. Sellars. 2022. “Fiscal Legibility and State Development: Theory and Evidence from Colonial Mexico.” Working Paper.

*Gennaioli, Nicola, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2015. “State Capacity and Military Conflict.” *Review of Economic Studies* 82(4):1409-1448.

Herbst, Jeffery I. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press.

Mayshar, Joram, Omer Moav, and Zvika Neeman. 2013. "Geography, Transparency, and Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 111(3):622-636.

Mayshar, Joram, Omer Moav, and Luigi Pascali. 2022. "The Origin of the State: Land Productivity or Appropriability?" *Journal of Political Economy* 130(4):1091-1144.

Queralt, Didac. 2019. "War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run." *International Organization*. 73(4):713-753.

*Sánchez de la Sierra, Raúl. 2020. "On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Political Economy* 128(1):32-74.

Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2012. "Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation." *American Political Science Review* 106(1):81-102.

Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing like a state: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press.

Slater, Daniel. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge University Press.

Thies, Cameron G. 2005. "War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3):451-465.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In P. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer and T. Skocpol eds. *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press.

Lecture 4, 1/26 – Where do strong states come from? – political competition and cooperation

*Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos. 2013. "The monopoly of violence: Evidence from Colombia." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(1):5-44.

Allen, Robert C., Mattia C. Bertazzini, and Leander Heldring. 2022. "The Economic Origins of Government." Working paper.

Balán, Pablo, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel. 2022. "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *American Economic Review* 112(3):762-797.

Bates, Robert H. 2017. *The Development Dilemma: Security, Prosperity, and a Return to History*. Princeton University Press.

Charnysh, Volha. 2019. "Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland." *American Political Science Review* 113:423-441.

Fergusson, Leopoldo, Horacio Larreguy, and Juan Felipe Riaño. Forthcoming. "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico." *Economic Journal*.

*Garfias, Francisco. 2018. "Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico." *American Political Science Review* 112(2):339-357.

*Garfias, Francisco. 2019. "Elite Coalitions, Limited Government, and Fiscal Capacity Development: Evidence from Bourbon Mexico." *Journal of Politics* 81(1):94-111.

Hariri, Jacob Gerner. 2012. "The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood." *American Political Science Review* 106(3):471-494.

Mares, Isabela, and Didac Queralt. 2015. "The non-democratic origins of income taxation." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(14):1974-2009.

Migdal, Joel. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States*. Princeton University Press.

*Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar. 2016. "Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India." *American Economic Review* 106(1):2895-2929.

Osafo-Kwaako, Philip, and James A. Robinson. 2013. "Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial Africa." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 41(1):534-564.

Scott, James. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press.

Lecture 5, 1/31 – When do elites support democratization? – bottom-up threats

*Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship*. Chapter 6.

*Aidt, Toke S., and Raphaël Franck. 2015. “Democratization under the threat of revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832.” *Econometrica* 83(2):505-547.

Aidt, Toke S., and Peter S. Jensen. 2014. “Workers of the World Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938.” *European Economic Review* 72:52-75.

Angelucci, Charles, Simone Meraglia, and Nico Voigtlander. 2022. “How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act.” *American Economic Review* 112(10):3441-3487.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.

Brückner, Markus, and Antonio Ciccone. 2011. “Rain and the democratic window of opportunity.” *Econometrica* 79(3):923-947.

Castañeda Dower, Paul, Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Steven Nafziger. 2018. “Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s great reforms.” *American Political Science Review* 112(1):125-147.

Gunitsky, Seva. 2018. “Democratic waves in historical perspective.” *Perspectives on Politics* 16(3):634-651.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2012. “Inequality and regime change: Democratic transitions and the stability of democratic rule.” *American Political Science Review* 106(3):495-516.

*+Hartman, Eric, and F. Daniel Hidalgo. 2018. “An Equivalence Approach to Balance and Placebo Tests.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4):1000-1013.

Houle, Christian. 2009. “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization.” *World Politics* 61(4):589-622.

Lecture 6, 2/2 – When do elites support democratization? – top-down opportunities

*Albertus, Michael, and Victor Gay. 2017. “Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3):624-641.

Ansell, Ben, and David Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and democratization: A contractarian approach.” *Comparative Political Studies* 43(12):1543-1574.

Dasgupta, Aditya. 2018. “Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India.” *American Political Science Review* 112(4):918-938.

Hollyer, James R., B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2005. “Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability.” *American Political Science Review* 109(4):764-784.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2018. *Democracy and Prosperity: The Reinvention of Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century*. Princeton University Press. Chapter 2.

*Jha, Saumitra. 2015. “Financial asset holdings and political attitudes: Evidence from revolutionary England.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130(3):1485-1545.

*Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico. 2004. “Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain’s “age of reform”.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119(2):707-765.

Llavorador, Humberto, and Robert J. Oxoby. 2005. “Partisan competition, growth, and the franchise.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120(3):1155-1189.

North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” *Journal of Economic History* 49(4):803-832.

Puga, Diego, and Daniel Trefler. 2014. “International trade and institutional change: Medieval Venice’s response to globalization.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(2):753-821.

Wantchekon, Leonard, and Omar Garcia-Ponce. 2013. "Critical Junctures: Independence Movements and Democracy in Africa." Working paper.

Woodberry, Robert. 2012. "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 106(2):244-274.

Lecture 7, 2/7 – Do democratic institutions make a difference?

*Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91:1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2015. "Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality." In *Handbook of Income Distribution Volume 2*, Elsevier, 1885-1966.

*Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. "Democracy does cause growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1):47-100.

Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review* 95(4):1190-1213.

*Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. 2019. "Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan." Working paper.

Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. 2017. "Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan." *Journal of Development Economics* 124:199-213.

*Dasgupta, Aditya, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "Capital Meets Democracy: The Impact of Franchise Extension on Sovereign Bond Markets." *American Journal of Political Science* 66(3):630-647.

Dell, Melissa, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2020. "The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java." *Review of Economic Studies* 87(1):164-203.

*Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:271-303.

Iyer, Lakshmi. 2010. "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4):693-713.

Martinez, Luis. 2022. "How Much Should We Trust the Dictator's GDP Growth Estimates?" *Journal of Political Economy* 130(10):2731-2769.

Meyersson, Erik. 2016. "Political Man on Horseback: Coups and Development." Working paper.

Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2014. "National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(1):151-213.

Mulligan, Casey, B., Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(1):51-74.

Nunn, Nathan. 2008. "The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1):139-176.

Olken, Benjamin A. 2010. "Direct democracy and local public goods: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia." *American Political Science Review* 104(2):243-267.

Paglayan, Agustina S. 2021. "The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years." *American Political Science Review* 115(1):179-198.

Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. "Democratisation and growth." *Economic Journal* 118(532):1520-1551.

Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg. 2005. "Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes?" *American Economic Review* 95(2):50-55.

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 9(2):131-165.

Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3):217-232.

Lecture 8, 2/9 – Why do political institutions have long-lasting effects?

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*.

*Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions." *American Economic Review* 98(1):267-293.

Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2010. "Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States." *Journal of European Economic Association* 9(2):177-208.

+Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen. 2016. "Explaining causal findings without bias: Detecting and assessing direct effects." *American Political Science Review* 110(3):512-529.

Bleakley, Hoyt, and Jeffrey Lin. 2012. "Portage and path dependence." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127(2):587-644.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, James D. Morrow, and Randolph M. Siverson. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press.

*Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders." *British Journal of Political Science* 32(4):559-590.

+Bullock, John G., Donald P. Green, and S. E. Ha. 2010. "Yes, but what's the mechanism? (don't expect an easy answer)." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 98(4):550-558.

Dal Bó, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bó, and Jason Snyder. 2009. "Political dynasties." *Review of Economic Studies* 76(1):115-142.

David, Paul A. 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." *American Economic Review* 75(2):332-337.

+Dawid, Philip, Macartan Humphreys, and Monica Musio. 2019. "Bounding Causes of Effects with Mediators." Working paper.

*Dell, Melissa. 2010. "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita." *Econometrica* 78(6):1863-1903.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11):1279-1301.

Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. 2001. "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism." In Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, Oxford University Press. Chapter 1.

+Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2011. "Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning About Causal Mechanisms From Experimental and Observational Studies." *American Political Science Review* 105(4):765-89.

*+Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2010. "Identification, Inference and Sensitivity Analysis for Causal Mediation Effects." *Statistical Science* 25(1):51-71.

*Querubin, Pablo. 2016. "Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(2):151-181.

+VanderWeele, Tyler. "Mediation Analysis: A Practitioner's Guide." *Annual Review of Public Health* 37:17-32.

Lecture 9, 2/14 – Core models of policy choice under (plurality) electoral competition

*Alesina, Alberto. 1988. "Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters." *American Economic Review* 78(4):796-805.

Arrow, Kenneth J. 2012. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. Yale University Press.

Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2014. "Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action." *Annual Review of Economics* 6:951-971.

Calvert, Randall L. 1985. "Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(1):69-95.

Dasgupta, Partha, and Eric Maskin. 2008. "On the Robustness of Majority Rule." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6(5):949-973.

Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition." *Public Choice* 52(3):273-297.

Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A rational theory of the size of government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5):914-927.

*Persson, Torsten, and Guido E. Tabellini. 2000. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. MIT Press. Chapters 2-3.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(1):27-59.

Lecture 10, 2/16 – The role of electoral and legislative institutions

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