Research
Information, citizen behavior, and political accountability/selection
John Marshall. The news voters use: Information consumption and electoral accountability in Mexico. [book outline]
Bowles, Jeremy, Kevin Croke, Horacio Larreguy, Shelley Liu, and John Marshall. Forthcoming. Sustaining Exposure to Fact-checks: Misinformation Discernment, Media Consumption, and its Political Implications. American Political Science Review. [preprint, registration, replication]
Abstract
Exposure to misinformation can affect citizens’ beliefs, political preferences, and compliance with government policies. However, little is known about how to durably reduce susceptibility to misinformation, particularly in the Global South. We evaluate an intervention in South Africa that encouraged individuals to consume biweekly fact-checks—as text messages or podcasts—via WhatsApp for six months. Sustained exposure to these fact-checks induced substantial internalization of fact-checked content, while increasing participants’ ability to discern new political and health misinformation upon exposure—especially when fact-check consumption was financially incentivized. Fact-checks that could be quickly consumed via short text messages or via podcasts with empathetic content were most effective. We find limited effects on news consumption choices or verification behavior, but still observe changes in political attitudes and COVID-19-related behaviors. These results demonstrate that sustained exposure to fact-checks can inoculate citizens against future misinformation, but highlight the difficulty of inducing broader behavioral changes relating to media usage.Arias, Eric, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. Forthcoming. When does information influence voters? Evidence from a field experiment varying the content and form of government performance leaflets. Latin American Economic Review. [registration, EGAP Metaketa I project]
Abstract
Evidence that information campaigns help voters select better politicians is mixed. We propose that comparative performance information and public dissemination may moderate information’s effects on electoral accountability, by respectively helping voters to identify malfeasance incumbent parties and facilitating coordination around the information. We test these mechanisms using a large-scale field experiment that provided voters with the results of audit reports documenting mayoral malfeasance before the 2015 Mexican municipal elections. We find that neither benchmarking incumbent performance against mayors from other parties within the state, nor accompanying leaflet delivery with loudspeakers announcing the leaflets’ delivery, significantly moderated the effects of information on voter beliefs or incumbent party vote share. Comparative performance information’s ineffectiveness likely reflects voters’ limited updating from the particular comparison provided, while the loudspeaker created common knowledge without meaningfully facilitating voter coordination. The results highlight challenges in designing informational campaigns to capture the theoretical conditions conducive to electoral accountability.Enríquez, José Ramón, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Alberto Simpser. 2024. Mass political information on social media: Facebook ads, electorate saturation, and electoral accountability in Mexico. Journal of the European Economic Association 22(4):1678-1722. [preprint, registration, replication]
Abstract
Social media’s capacity to quickly and inexpensively reach large audiences almost simultaneously has the potential to promote electoral accountability. Beyond increasing direct exposure to information, high saturation campaigns—which target substantial fractions of an electorate—may induce or amplify information diffusion, persuasion, or coordination between voters. Randomizing saturation across municipalities, we evaluate the electoral impact of non-partisan Facebook ads informing millions of Mexican citizens of municipal expenditure irregularities in 2018. The vote shares of incumbent parties that engaged in zero/negligible irregularities increased by 6–7 percentage points in directly-targeted electoral precincts. This direct effect, but also the indirect effect in untargeted precincts within treated municipalities, were significantly greater where ads targeted 80%—rather than 20%—of the municipal electorate. The amplifying effects of high saturation campaigns are driven by citizens within more socially-connected municipalities, rather than responses by politicians or media outlets. These findings demonstrate how mass media can ignite social interactions to promote political accountability.Bhandari, Abhit, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. 2023. Able and mostly willing: An empirical anatomy of information’s effect on voter-driven accountability in Senegal. American Journal of Political Science 67(4):1040-1066. [preprint, registration, replication, AJPS blog]
Abstract
Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and—upon receiving information—voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter-level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and nonelectoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contact after elections while incumbent vote choice increased among likely voters and voters prioritizing local projects when appraising incumbents. In contrast, information about incumbent duties did not systematically influence beliefs or accountability. These findings suggest voters were able and mostly willing to use relevant information to hold politicians to account.Arias, Eric, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. 2022. Priors rule: When do malfeasance revelations help or hurt incumbent parties? Journal of the European Economic Association 20(4):1433-1477. [preprint, registration, replication, EGAP Metaketa I project]
Abstract
Effective policy-making requires that voters avoid electing malfeasant politicians. However, informing voters of incumbent malfeasance in corrupt contexts may not reduce incumbent support. As our simple learning model shows, electoral sanctioning is limited where voters already believed incumbents to be malfeasant, while information’s effect on turnout is non-monotonic in the magnitude of reported malfeasance. We conducted a field experiment in Mexico that informed voters about malfeasant mayoral spending before municipal elections, to test whether these Bayesian predictions apply in a developing context where many voters are poorly informed. Consistent with voter learning, the intervention increased incumbent vote share where voters possessed unfavorable prior beliefs and when audit reports caused voters to favorably update their posterior beliefs about the incumbent’s malfeasance. Furthermore, we find that low and, especially, high malfeasance revelations increased turnout, while less surprising information reduced turnout. These results suggest that improved governance requires greater transparency and citizen expectations.Alt, James E., Amalie Jensen, Horacio Larreguy, David D. Lassen, and John Marshall. 2022. Diffusing political concerns: How unemployment information passed between social ties influences Danish voters. Journal of Politics 84(1):383-404. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
While social pressure is widely believed to influence voters, evidence that information passed between social ties affects beliefs, policy preferences, and voting behavior is limited. We investigate whether information about unemployment shocks diffuses through networks of strong and mostly weak social ties and influences voters in Denmark. We link surveys with population-level administrative data that log unemployment shocks afflicting respondents’ familial, vocational, and educational networks. Our results show that the share of second-degree social ties—individuals that voters learn about indirectly—that became unemployed within the last year increases a voter’s perception of national unemployment, self-assessed risk of becoming unemployed, support for unemployment insurance, and voting for left-wing political parties. Voters’ beliefs about national aggregates respond to all shocks similarly, whereas subjective perceptions and preferences respond primarily to unemployment shocks afflicting second-degree ties in similar vocations. This suggests that information diffusion through social ties principally affects political preferences via egotropic—rather than sociotropic—motives.Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2020. Publicising malfeasance: When the local media structure facilitates electoral accountability in Mexico. Economic Journal 130(631):2291-2327. [preprint, replication, Nieman lab, Global Anti-Corruption blog]
Abstract
Malfeasance in local governments is common in developing democracies. Electoral accountability could mitigate such malfeasance, but may require media market structures that incentivise profit-maximising local media to report on incumbent malfeasance. We test this claim in Mexico, leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in the pre-election release of municipal audits revealing misallocated spending and access to broadcast media. We find that each additional local media station amplifies voter punishment (rewards) of high (zero) malfeasance by up to 1 percentage point. Local media’s accountability-enhancing effects are greater when there are fewer non-local competitors and where local outlets’ audiences principally reside within their municipality.Larreguy, Horacio and John Marshall. 2020. The Incentives and Effects of Independent and Government-Controlled Media in the Developing World. In the Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion, edited by Elizabeth Suhay, Bernard Grofman, and Alexander Trechsel. Oxford University Press. Pages 590-617. [preprint]
Abstract
The rise of broadcast and then digital media has had important political implications across the developing world. First considering independent media outlets, we review evidence showing that the media’s editorial content, revelation of information about candidates, and capacity to provide a platform for politicians can significantly shape electoral outcomes and mobilization. Unlike established democracies, the media is often used to buttress and oppose autocratic regimes. With respect to government control of the media, we review evidence of media bias, as well as its determinants and effectiveness at reducing opposition. With respect to media’s liberation potential, we examine how broadcast and internet-based technologies are—not without difficulties—providing new opportunities for facilitating dissent and change. We highlight methodological innovations, the challenges of isolating theoretical mechanisms, and avenues for future research throughout.Arias, Eric, Pablo Balán, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. 2019. Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks. American Political Science Review 113(2):475-498. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
How do social networks moderate the way political information influences electoral accountability? We propose a simple model in which incumbent malfeasance revelations can facilitate coordination around less malfeasant challenger parties in highly connected voter networks, even when voters update favorably about incumbent party malfeasance. We provide evidence from Mexico of this mechanism by leveraging a field experiment in a context where the provision of incumbent malfeasance information increased support for incumbent parties, despite voters continuing to believe that challengers were less malfeasant than incumbents. Combining this experiment with detailed family network data, we show that—consistent with the model—the increase in incumbent party vote share due to information provision was counteracted by coordination around less malfeasant challengers in precincts with greater network connectedness. Individual-level data further demonstrate that networks facilitated explicit and tacit coordination among voters. These findings suggest that networks can help voters coordinate around information to help remove poorly performing politicians.Dunning, Thad, Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, Susan Hyde, Craig McIntosh, Gareth Nellis, Claire L. Adida, Eric Arias, Clara Bicalho, Taylor C. Boas, Mark T. Buntaine, Simon Chauchard, Anirvan Chowdhury, Jessica Gottlieb, F. Daniel Hidalgo, Marcus Holmlund, Ryan Jablonski, Eric Kramon, Horacio Larreguy, Malte Lierl, John Marshall, Gwyneth McClendon, Marcus A. Melo, Daniel L. Nielson, Paula M. Pickering, Melina R. Platas, Pablo Querubín, Pia Raffler, and Neelanjan Sircar. 2019. Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials. Science Advances 5(7):eaaw2612. [registration, replication, EGAP Metaketa I project]
Abstract
Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses suggest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.Arias, Eric, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. 2019. When Does Information Increase Electoral Accountability? Lessons from a Field Experiment In Mexico. In Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I, edited by Thad Dunning, Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, Susan Hyde, Craig McIntosh, and Gareth Nellis. Cambridge University Press. Pages 118-155. [registration, EGAP Metaketa I project]
Marshall, John. 2019. Signaling sophistication: How social expectations can increase political information acquisition. Journal of Politics 81(1):167-186. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
Information plays an integral role in theories of political behavior. However, little is known about why—if ever—voters choose to acquire political information. This article proposes that voters strategically acquire costly political information to cultivate a reputation among their peers as politically sophisticated. I test this theory in Mexico using experimental and observational research designs that exogenously vary the likelihood that individuals’ peers observe the political knowledge they possess. The results demonstrate that social incentives significantly increase political knowledge among voters nested within groups that collectively value political knowledge. Consistent with the model, I find that relatively unsophisticated voters seek to reach a minimum standard within their social group, while more sophisticated voters acquire higher levels of information to differentiate themselves from less informed peers. These findings indicate that social networks can increase informed participation in a major nonconsolidated democracy, but they also highlight how politically disengaged networks can generate information traps.Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2018. Leveling the playing field: How equalizing access to campaign advertising helps locally non-dominant parties in consolidating democracies. Journal of the European Economic Association 16(6):1812-1849. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
We examine how campaign advertising affects electoral support. We propose a simple model where advertising disproportionately benefits non-dominant political parties, because voters are uncertain about and biased against such parties. We test this argument in Mexico, where one of the three main parties dominates in many localities. To identify the effects of exposure to campaign advertising, we exploit differences across neighboring precincts in campaign ad distribution. These differences originate from cross-state media coverage spillovers induced by a 2007 reform that equalized access to ad slots across all broadcast media. We find that, on average, ads on AM radio increase the vote shares of the PAN and the PRD, but not the previously hegemonic PRI. Consistent with our model, campaign advertising is most effective in poorly informed and politically uncompetitive electoral precincts, and against locally dominant parties of intermediate strength.Alt, James E., David D. Lassen, and John Marshall. 2016. Credible sources and sophisticated voters: When does new information induce economic voting? Journal of Politics 78(2):327-343. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
When does new economic information cause voters to reevaluate the government’s competence and ultimately vote economically? Since politically relevant information is often conveyed by actors with incentives to influence voter perceptions, the credibility of information sources can vary significantly. This article randomly varies whether voters receive an aggregate unemployment forecast from the central bank, government or main opposition party using a survey experiment in Denmark linked to detailed panel data. We find that politically sophisticated voters discern differences in institutional credibility and the political cost of the signal and update their unemployment expectations accordingly. Despite failing to differentiate political costs, unsophisticated voters still substantially update their expectations. However, while sophisticated voters intend to engage in substantial prospective economic voting, unsophisticated voters do not relate their new unemployment expectations to their vote intention. These findings suggest that economic information supports economic voting most when it is credible and reaches sophisticated voters.Marshall, John and Stephen D. Fisher. 2015. Economic Globalization and Declining Electoral Turnout: Compensation, Constraint and Ownership. British Journal of Political Science 45(2):353-389. [preprint, replication, Democratic Audit UK]
Abstract
This article extends theoretical arguments regarding the impact of economic globalization on policy making to electoral turnout and considers how distinct dimensions of globalization may produce different effects. It theorizes that constraints on government policy that reduce incentives to vote are more likely to be induced by foreign ownership of capital, while compensation through increased government spending is more likely (if at all) to be the product of structural shifts in production associated with international trade. Using data from twenty-three OECD countries from 1970–2007, the study finds strong support for the ownership-constraint hypothesis in which foreign ownership reduces turnout, both directly and – in strict opposition to the compensation hypothesis – indirectly by reducing government spending (and thus the importance of politics). The results suggest that increased foreign ownership, especially the most mobile capital flows, can explain up to two-thirds of the large declines in turnout over recent decades.Marshall, John. 2023. Political information cycles: When do voters sanction incumbent parties for high homicide rates? R&R, Journal of the European Economic Association.
Bowles, Jeremy, John Marshall, and Pia Raffler. 2024. Access to social media and support for elected autocrats: Field experimental and observational evidence from Uganda. [registration] R&R, American Political Science Review.
Kronick, Dorothy and John Marshall. 2024. Collateral censorship: Theory and evidence from Venezuela. Working paper.
Henn, Soeren J., Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. 2024. How unobserved investments inhibit public service delivery in corrupt environments. Working paper.
Lucas, Christopher, John Marshall, and Zara Riaz. 2020. Don’t read all about it: Drug trafficking organizations and media reporting on violence in Mexico. Working paper.
Larreguy, Horacio, Christopher Lucas, and John Marshall. 2024. When do media stations support political accountability? Evidence from a field experiment in Mexico. Working paper (available upon request). [registration]
Enríquez, José Ramón, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Alberto Simpser. 2024. Accountability under political polarization. Working paper (available upon request). [registration]
Education, political preferences, and voting behavior
Marshall, John. 2019. The anti-Democrat diploma: How high school education decreases support for the Democratic party. American Journal of Political Science 61(1):67-83. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
Attending high school can alter students' life trajectories by affecting labor market prospects and through exposure to ideas and networks. However, schooling's influence competes with early socialization forces and may be confounded by selection biases. Consequently, little is known about whether or how high school education shapes downstream political preferences and voting behavior. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design leveraging variation in U.S. state dropout laws across cohorts, I find that raising the school dropout age decreases Democratic partisan identification and voting later in life. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that an additional completed grade of high school decreases Democratic support by around 15 percentage points among students induced to remain in school by higher dropout ages. High school's effects principally operate by increasing income and support for conservative economic policies, especially at an individual's midlife earnings peak. In contrast, such schooling does not affect conservative attitudes on noneconomic issues or political engagement.Cavaille, Charlotte and John Marshall. 2019. Education and anti-immigration attitudes: Evidence from compulsory schooling reforms across Western Europe. American Political Science Review 113(1):254-263. [preprint, replication; the syntax and bias correction method for the “rdrobust” command have been updated since we published this paper]
Abstract
Low levels of education are a powerful predictor of anti-immigrationsentiment. However, there is little consensus on the interpretationof this correlation: is it causal or is it an artifact of selectionbias? We address this question by exploiting six major compulsoryschooling reforms in five Western European countries—Denmark,France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden—that haverecently experienced politically influential anti-immigrationmovements. On average, we find that compelling students to remain insecondary school for at least an additional year decreasesanti-immigration attitudes later in life. Instrumental variableestimates demonstrate that, among such compliers, an additional yearof secondary schooling substantially reduces the probability ofopposing immigration, believing that immigration erodes a country’squality of life, and feeling close to far-right anti-immigrationparties. These results suggest that rising post-war educationalattainment has mitigated the rise of anti-immigration movements. Wediscuss the mechanisms and implications for future researchexamining anti-immigration sentiment.Larreguy, Horacio and John Marshall. 2017. The effect of education on political engagement in non-consolidated democracies: Evidence from Nigeria. Review of Economics and Statistics 99(3):387-401. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
Developing democracies are experiencing unprecedented increases in primary and secondary schooling. To identify education's long-run political effects, we use a difference-in-differences design that leverages variation across local government areas and gender in the intensity of Nigeria's 1976 universal primary education reform—one of Africa's largest ever educational expansions—to instrument for education. We find large increases in basic civic and political engagement: better educated citizens are more attentive to politics, more likely to vote, and more involved in community associations. The effects are largest among minority groups and in fractionalized areas, without increasing support for political violence or own-group identification.Croke, Kevin, Guy Grossman, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. 2016. Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. American Political Science Review 110(3):579-600. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
A large literature examining advanced and consolidating democracies suggests that education increases political participation. However, in electoral authoritarian regimes, educated voters may instead deliberately disengage. If education increases critical capacities, political awareness, and support for democracy, educated citizens may believe that participation is futile or legitimizes autocrats. We test this argument in Zimbabwe—a paradigmatic electoral authoritarian regime—by exploiting cross-cohort variation in access to education following a major educational reform. We find that education decreases political participation, substantially reducing the likelihood that better-educated citizens vote, contact politicians, or attend community meetings. Consistent with deliberate disengagement, education’s negative effect on participation dissipated following 2008’s more competitive election, which (temporarily) initiated unprecedented power sharing. Supporting the mechanisms underpinning our hypothesis, educated citizens experience better economic outcomes, are more interested in politics, and are more supportive of democracy, but are also more likely to criticize the government and support opposition parties.Marshall, John. 2016. Education and voting Conservative: Evidence from a major schooling reform in Great Britain. Journal of Politics 78(2):382-395. [preprint, replication; the syntax and bias correction method for the “rdrobust” command have been updated since I published this paper]
Abstract
High school education is central to adolescent socialization and has important downstream consequences for adult life. However, scholars examining schooling’s political effects have struggled to reconcile education’s correlation with both more liberal social attitudes and greater income. To disentangle this relationship, I exploit a major school leaving age reform in Great Britain that caused almost half the population to remain at high school for at least an additional year. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I find that each additional year of late high school increases the probability of voting Conservative in later life by 12 percentage points. A similar relationship holds when pooling all cohorts, suggesting that high school education is a key determinant of voting behavior and that the reform could have significantly altered electoral outcomes. I provide evidence suggesting that, by increasing an individual’s income, education increases support for right-wing economic policies and, ultimately, the Conservative Party.Clientelism and party election strategies
Cruz, Cesi, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. 2020. Social network effects in developing countries. In the Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion, edited by Elizabeth Suhay, Bernard Grofman, and Alexander Trechsel. Oxford University Press. Pages 645-667. [preprint]
Abstract
How do social networks influence and moderate electoral persuasion in developing countries? An extensive literature shows that social networks are important for understanding electoral persuasion in established democracies. At the same time, these theories might not necessarily apply to democracies in the developing world, particularly when they are characterized by clientelism, coercion, and other modes of political engagement outside of formal democratic institutions. In such contexts, networks can matter for politics in different, and sometimes unexpected, ways. In surveying the literature, this chapter dentifies three general functions of networks that are important for understanding electoral persuasion behavior in developing countries: (i) information diffusion; (ii) social persuasion; and (iii) coordination and enforcement. The chapter explores the implications of these network mechanisms by exploring the roles of both voter and politician networks.Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. 2016. When do parties buy turnout? How monitoring capacity facilitates voter mobilization in Mexico. American Political Science Review 110(1):160-179. [preprint, replication]
Abstract
Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn out. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of polling stations—and thus electoral information about broker performance—in Mexican electoral precincts, we find that greater monitoring capacity increases turnout and votes for the National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the effect of monitoring capacity on PRI votes varies nonlinearly with the distance of voters to the polling station: it first increases because rural voters—facing larger costs of voting—generally favor the PRI, before declining as the cost of incentivizing brokers increases. This nonlinearity is not present for the PAN, who stand to gain less from mobilizing rural voters.Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and Laura Trucco. 2018. Breaking clientelism or rewarding incumbents? Evidence from an urban titling program in Mexico. Working paper.
Abstract
Clientelism is common in developing countries, and often detrimentally affects political accountability and public good provision. However, little is known about how clientelistic ties can be broken because policy reforms that could reduce voter dependence on incumbents for special favors may also cause voters to reward the reform’s architects. Exploiting Mexico’s federal structure and changes in incumbency over time, we separate these countervailing effects in the context of a federal land titling program that reached nearly 2.2 million urban households over 35 years. Our results demonstrate that programmatic reforms can both reduce clientelism while also rewarding incumbents for their policies.COVID-19 vaccines: information, collective action, and vaccine diplomacy
Barham, Elena, Sarah Z. Daly, Julian E. Gerez, John Marshall, and Oscar Pocasangre. 2023. Vaccine Diplomacy: How COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution in Latin America Increases Trust in Foreign Governments. World Politics 75(4):826-875. [preprint, replication, Foreign Policy]
Abstract
Vaccine distribution in the Global South has created opportunities for vaccine-developing countries to improve their international reputations. Leveraging a panel survey conducted in early 2021, this article evaluates whether vaccine diplomacy affects trust in foreign governments in six Latin American countries. Among vaccinated respondents, trust in the government of the country that they believed developed their vaccine increased relative to trust in the governments of other foreign powers. Furthermore, providing information about the aggregate distribution of vaccines within a respondent's country increased vaccine-eligible respondents' trust in the governments of countries from which more vaccines were delivered. In each case, greater trust principally reflects updated perceptions of a common good motivation. The article's empirical findings suggest that vaccine distribution—especially by China, but for other vaccine-developing countries as well—can cultivate favorable international public opinion. These favorable opinions may in turn facilitate great powers' economic, political, or military foreign policy goals.Argote, Pablo, Elena Barham, Sarah Z. Daly, Julian E. Gerez, John Marshall, and Oscar Pocasangre. 2021. Messages that increase COVID-19 vaccine acceptance: Evidence from online experiments in six Latin American countries. PLoS One 16(10):e0259059. [registration, replication, Communication Initiative]
Abstract
As safe and effective vaccines become widely available, attaining herd immunity and limiting the spread of COVID-19 will depend on individuals choosing to vaccinate—and doing so quickly enough to outpace mutations. Using online surveys conducted across six Latin American countries in January 2021, we experimentally assess messages designed to counteract informational deficiencies and collective action problems that may drive hesitancy. We first find that basic vaccine information persuades around 8% of hesitant individuals to become willing to vaccinate, reduces intended wait to vaccinate by 0.4 months, and increases willingness to encourage others to vaccinate. Rather than facilitating free riding, learning, or social conformity, additional information about others’ behavior increases vaccine acceptance when respondents expect herd immunity will be achieved. Finally, priming the social approval benefits of vaccinating also increases vaccine acceptance. These results suggest that providing information and shaping social expectations and incentives could both significantly increase vaccine uptake.Argote, Pablo, Elena Barham, Sarah Z. Daly, Julian E. Gerez, John Marshall, and Oscar Pocasangre. 2021. The Shot, the Message, and the Messenger: COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance in Latin America. Nature Partner Journal - Vaccines 6:118. [registration, replication]
Abstract
Herd immunity by mass vaccination offers the potential to substantially limit the continuing spread of COVID-19, but high levels of vaccine hesitancy threaten this goal. In a cross-country analysis of vaccine hesitant respondents across Latin America in January 2021, we experimentally tested how five features of mass vaccination campaigns—the vaccine’s producer, efficacy, endorser, distributor, and current population uptake rate—shifted willingness to take a COVID-19 vaccine. We find that citizens preferred Western-produced vaccines, but were highly influenced by factual information about vaccine efficacy. Vaccine hesitant individuals were more responsive to vaccine messengers with medical expertise than political, religious, or media elite endorsements. Citizen trust in foreign governments, domestic leaders, and state institutions moderated the effects of the campaign features on vaccine acceptance. These findings can help inform the design of unfolding mass inoculation campaigns.Statistical methods and data
Calderón Hernández, Bruno, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and José Luis Pérez Castellanos. 2025. Electoral precinct-level database for Mexican municipal elections. Scientific Data 12(582).
Abstract
This paper introduces a database of electoral precinct-level election returns for Mexican municipal elections between 1994 and 2019. This database includes: (i) electoral precinct-level votes for each electoral coalition, the coalitions of the incumbent mayor and incumbent state governor, and the four most popular political parties; (ii) electoral precinct-level valid and total votes, the number of registered voters, and turnout; (iii) the partisan composition and municipal-level votes of the incumbent and runner-up electoral coalitions from the previous election; and (iv) the partisan composition of the state-level incumbent governor. This paper outlines the organization of this data, its sources, and key variables, and describes the processes used to standardize the data. This database has the potential to support the cross-sectional and longitudinal study of local Mexican elections over two decades using fine-grained precinct-level electoral returns that enable panel and regression discontinuity analyses.Marshall, John. 2024. Can close election regression discontinuity designs identify effects of winning politician characteristics? American Journal of Political Science 68(2):494-510. [preprint, replication, AJPS blog]
Abstract
Politician characteristic regression discontinuity (PCRD) designs leveraging close elections are widely used to isolate effects of an elected politician characteristic on downstream outcomes. Unlike standard regression discontinuity designs, treatment is defined by a predetermined characteristic that could affect a politician's victory margin. I prove that, by conditioning on politicians who win close elections, PCRD estimators identify the effect of the specific characteristic of interest and all compensating differentials—candidate-level characteristics that ensure elections remain close between candidates who differ in the characteristic of interest. Avoiding this asymptotic bias generally requires assuming either that the characteristic of interest does not affect candidate vote shares or that no compensating differential affects the outcome. Because theories of voting behavior suggest that neither strong assumption usually holds, I further analyze the implications for interpreting continuity tests and consider if and how covariate adjustment, bounding, and recharacterizing treatment can mitigate the posttreatment bias afflicting PCRD designs.Marshall, John. 2016. Coarsening bias: How instrumenting for coarsened treatments upwardly biases instrumental variable estimates. Political Analysis 24(2):157-171. [preprint, replication]